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Interaction Predictors 
Abstract 
In attempting to explain the degree of cooperation in the leader~ 
follower dyad, leadership style and situational outcome, in a mixed-
motive game, were controlled. 1?0 business employees, both male and 
female, were paired with a leader who was projected as a Prisoner's 
Dilemma game expert. The subject, with the help of the leader who 
was either democratic or autocratic, then played a round of the game 
against a confederate subject. The win/lose outcome of the first 
game was controlled. The subject was then given the opportunity to 
play a second game against the leader, and the number of competitive 
choices made by the subject was recorded. After the second game, 
the subject completed an attribution questionnaire. The results in-
dicated that neither leadership style nor first game outcome effected 
the amount of cooperation in the second game, however, women were 
significantly more cooperative than men. Analysis of the attribu-
tion scale showed that women rated the leader as more pleasant than 
did the men, and the experimental groups rated the leader as more 
pleasant than did the control subjects. The short interaction 
utilized in this study was viewed as a major factor which may have 
had a strong influence on the results. 
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The Leader's Method and the Follower's Outcome: 
Predictors of Future Interaction 
Social psychologists have assumed the task of explaining the 
initiation, development, and termination of social events as they 
exist over a large range of personal interactions. The dyadic 
relationship comprises only one small facet of social research and 
yet it is critical due to the foundation it provides for further 
group .development. 1his research studied only one example of the 
dyad, that of the leader-follower relationship. This specific 
situation is of interest due to the leader's increasing difficulty 
in meeting production requirements, maintaining product quality, 
and building worker motivation. This research was an attempt to 
provide empirical support for utilizing a specific leadership 
style and the importance of considering other related facets of 
the follower's environment so that a more productive dyadic re-
lationship may be developed. 
In reviewing past research in the areas of leadership, power, 
and authority, two prominent leadership styles, autocratic and 
democratic, emerge as those most often studied. Lewin, Lippitt, 
and White (1939) nrovided valuable insight into several opposing 
styles with their classic study of leadership and group life. 
The experimenters in that research assigned various types of 
leaders to several groups of boy's clubs. The group which was 
given an autocratic leader reported a very controlled atmosphere, 
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discontent and irritability directed toward other group members 
and the leader, a great deal of nonconstructive criticism from 
the leader, and a lack of ability for the members to direct group 
activities. In the democratic leader's group, there was a relaxed 
atmosphere, opportunity for self-direction and social interaction, 
and an environment which allowed the leader to be viewed as a 
partner who deserved the member's cooperation. 
Other research has looked directly at the authority or power 
relationship. Adams and Romney (1959) proposed a functional analysis 
of authority based on a Skinnerian, verbal behavior, reinforcement 
paradigm. They suggested that the authority relationship was asym-
metrical in that the authority's initial response specifies its own 
reinforcement, whereas the follower's does not. Their central idea 
in authority relations was that of reciprocal control and reinforce-
ment of two individuals. Basically, their paradigm stated that when 
a person performed a task directed by an authority, the authority 
was reinforced by its completion and the follower was reinforced 
by the authority's acknowledgement of his performance. However, 
should the follower not comply with the request, or the authority 
not acknowledge its completion, there is a break in the authority 
sequence and the authority loses power over the follower. Harvey 
and Smith (1977) wrote that power is never a one-way street, 
"if the existence of a social relationship depends on all parties 
believing they can receive outcomes better than they could get 
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outside the relationship, then all are dependent on the relation-
ship in at least some measure" (p. 306). 
The area of cooperation and competition is another major 
aspect of the leader-follower relationship. Kelly and Stahelski 
(1970a) conducted research which helped to explain this portion 
of the dyadic interaction. Their subjects were made to choose a 
cooperative or competitive strategy in a Prisoner's Dilemma game. 
·The subjects were then paired with persons of opposite goal choices. 
During the game, they were interrupted to ask their judgements of 
each other's goals. The most common error in perception of goal, 
consisted of a judgement by the competitive person that his co-
operative partner was competitive. This misjudgement was a result 
of a behavioral shift in the cooperative-competitive interaction, 
as the cooperative subject tended to behave more like the com-
petitive one. This shift is seen as a temporary means of adapting 
to a competitive adversary, and not a permanent change in the selected 
goal. Additionally, the cooperative individual, but not the com-
petitive one, is aware of the latter's dominant role in the relation-
ship. 
The purpose of this research was to study the leader's effect 
on the follower. While not as precise as the Adams and Romney 
(1959) paradigm nor as subjective as the Lewin et al. (1939) re-
search, this work was an attempt to test if cooperation, directed 
toward the leader by the follower, was effected by the differences 
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in autocratic and democratic leadership. The research discuss-
ed made it logical to support an emergent hypothesis: a follower 
who has experienced democratic leadership, when placed in an equal 
relationship with that leader, will react in a more cooperative 
manner than a follower who experienced autocratic leadership. 
Reciprocation, reinforcement, and equity have a direct in-
fluence on the reward structure in the leader-follower dyad. 
Reciprocation centers on the benefits gained or lost by both 
parties. The Adams and Romney (1959) paradigm mentioned above 
emphasized a reciprocal aspect involving the follower's completion 
of a requested action and the authority's acknowledgement of the 
same as being the key to a workable relationship. Equity research 
looks into the distribution of rewards and payoffs as a function 
of previous distributions and future interactions. Studies by 
Leventhal, Weiss, and Long (1969), Garrett and Libby (1973), and 
Shapiro (1975) showed that when a first payoff was divided, if one 
member was over or under rewarded intentionally, that individual 
would consider that outcome when he distributed a subsequent 
payoff. However, if the under or over reward was a result of 
chance, it did not figure into the computation of future payoffs. 
Reinforcement in the dyadic relationship is also of interest. 
Davidson and Steiner (1971) provided research results indicating 
that reinforcements are communicative acts that inform the re-
cipient of the probable intentions, attitudes, and freedom of the 
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agent who administers them. Considering these factors in the 
dyad, it seemed logical to hypothesize that if a follower failed 
to achieve his desired goal as a result of the leader's direction, 
he would respond less cooperatively to the leader than would a 
follower who achieved his goal due to the leader's direction. 
In support of the Lewin et al. (1939) findings, and the 
direction of reseach in the areas of reinforcement and equity, 
this study manipulated both the leader's methods and the follower's 
outcome. It was hypothesized that the interaction of leadership 
style and situation outcome variables would result in the greatest 
follower competition against the leader in that situation where 
the leader was autocratic and the follower failed to achieve his 
goal due to the leader's direction. And conversely, that the 
least evidence of follower competition would exist in that sit-
uation which involved a democratic leader whose follower achieved 
his goal due to the leader's direction. 
The possibility of a sex difference, as a function of either 
leadership style or situational outcome, deserved consideration 
as a major factor. There have been many sex difference studies, 
but such research directly related to cooperation and competition 
is scarce, conflicting, and controversial. Pruitt (1967), utilizing 
college students, found a game by sex interaction in his study of 
Prisoner's Dilemma. The results showed that women were more co-
operative than men in the first phases of several games. In 
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attempting to account for this outcome, the author suggested a 
possible basis to be the degree of generosity available and that 
women tended to be more generous. A pilot study using college 
students and conducted in preparation for this research (Nimmich, 
1977), produced a significant post hoc sex difference due to greater 
cooperation by the women. Thus it would appear that the sex factor 
should be controlled in all future research in this area and_it 
was a major variable in this study. It was hypothesized that 
women would display greater cooperation than men but that this 
factor would not be involved in any interactions. 
An experiment such as this must consider the domain of attribu-
tion. Most activities which take place between the members of a 
dyad, are related to personal motives which one member attributes 
to the other. The follower may attribute the leader's style to 
his personality or to the work situation. The direction the 
attribution takes will effect the relationship as it develops 
and changes. Kelley and Stahelski (1970b), in their comparison 
of cooperative and noncooperative college students, reported that 
each player attributed the other's behavior to their own view of 
these personality dimensions. Harvey and Smith (1977) wrote 
that an individual was more likely to attribute intent where it 
was consistent than where it was inconsistent. Previously, 
numerous assumptions have been made about attributions of in-
terpersonal influence without sufficient data. To combat this 
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problem and to provide possible explanation for the follower's 
reaction to the leader, this study utilized an experimenter-
developed attribution scale using a semantic differential format. 
This questionnaire is described in the method section and provided 
information concerning the subject's intentions and the intentions 
he attributed to the leader and/or his opponents. The analysis of 
this scale provided a comparison of the experimental groups and 
another method of verifying the manipulation of leadership style 
and situational outcome. 
Method 
Subjects 
Subjects were 120 volunteer employees from banking, industry, 
government, and department stores in the metropolitan area of Rich-
mond, VA. These employees covered a cross section of educational 
background and level of employment. Since a leader must work with 
all types, this subject pool seemed a good representation of the 
actual population of followers. 
Apparatus 
The experiment required a small room which contained a table 
divided in half by a partition which was approximately two feet high. 
At one end of the table were two chairs, at the other end one chair, 
and in the middle, at the partition, one chair for the experimenter. 
Two identical, plastic-protected sheets, each printed with five 
matrices, and necessary tally sheets to record the points awarded, 
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were required for the experiment. 
The matrix used for this study (Figure 1) was a non-zero sum, 
Prisoner's Dilermna game as developed and researched by Rapoport 
and Chammah (1965). A major concern was the response set used by 
the leader during his game against the subject. Oskamp (1971) 
and Wrightsman and Brigham (1973) provided the pertinent research 
by reporti~g that a matching or tit-for-tat response set induced 
. the greatest percentage of cooperative responses. Since the measure 
used in this study's analysis was the number of competitive responses, 
it statistically strengthened the results to use a cooperative in-
ducing response set in order that the subject could logically 
pursue a cooperative strategy. 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
The semantic differential format for the attribution scale, 
given after completion of the second game, consisted of four questions: 





. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ----------
. . . . . . . . ·-·--·---·----·--·-·--· 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -------. . . . . . . . ·-·--·-·--·-·-·-· 





Cooperative :_: __ :_: ___ : __ : ___ :_: Uncooperative 
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Inefficient : : : : : : : Efficient --------
Unsure : : : : : : : Confident --------
Careful : : : : : : : : Careless -------





. . . . . . . . . . . . . . -------. . . . . . . . . . . . -------. . . . . . . . . . . . . . -------
: : : : : : --------




. . . . . . . . . . . . . . -------. . . . . . . 
---·---·----·--·----·---·----· 








In the control condition, the word "leader" in questions 1 and h 
was changed to "bystander" and '·'second opponent" respectively. 
Two additional yes/no questions checked for the confounding in-
fluences of prior information and whether the subjects were able 
to explain how the experiment operated. 
Procedure 
The subject arrived at the location for the experiment and 
signed a consent form. The leader (constant male confederate) 
and the experimenter were already present. As the subject signed 
the form, another subject (female confederate) entered the room. 
Next, a rigged card drawing took place which resulted in the 
subject being teamed with the leader for the first game. 
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At this time all participants were directed to their seats 
and the experimenter explained to the subject that the leader was 
well versed in the game procedure and would be quite helpful in 
obtaining the goal of maximum possible points. The game procedure 
was then explained to all participants through the use of a sample 
matrix. Additionally, during this explanation phase, the confederate 
subject asked two standard questions in order to increase her cred-
. ibility as a real subject. 
The actions of the leader in the democratic role consisted of: 
greeting the subject upon his arrival, offering to keep score, and 
providing advice while allowing the subject freedom in his choices. 
Conversely, the autocratic role consisted of: a serious and un-
friendly demeanor, taking the tally sheet and thus not allowing 
the subject to keep score, and directing the subject's choices 
while not allowing any difference in opinion. 
The first game consisted of working through the five matrices 
three times. The experimenter gave appropriate responses for the 
confederate subject to insure that the win/lose condition was 
established. These contrived responses were standardized as much 
as possible according to the subject's responses. The subject's 
responses were directed by the leader who followed a set, begin-
ning with cooperation (first S) and then randomly alternating from 
that point on. Upon completion of that game, the scores were 
tallied and a winner and loser announced. 
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After this announcement, the subject was informed that he would 
be given the opportunity to play the game on his own. The confed-
erate subject was thanked for her participation and warned against 
discussing the experiment; the leader moved to the other end of the 
table and the second game began. 
The second game utilized the same five matrices, three times, 
with the subject required to make his own 2-choice decisions. 
The response set given by the leader was cooperative on the first 
choice and from then on the leader simply reflected the latest 
response given by the subject - a tit-for-tat strategy. During this 
game, the number of competitive choices made by the subject was 
recorded by the experimenter. 
At the completion of the second game the outcome was announced 
and the subject was asked to complete the attribution scale. The 
win/lose outcome of the second game was not controlled as it did not 
effect the experimental manipulation. The subject was then given a 
short statement to read which explained exactly what took place in 
the experiment. Any questions were also answered. The subject was 
thanked for his participation, requested not to discuss the experi-
ment, and excused. 
In the control (no leader) condition, the leader and confed-
erate subject arrived after the subject. A similar rigged drawing 
took place with the subject being selected to play two games: first 
against the confederate subject and then against the usual leader. 
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During the game explanation, the leader looked on with the subject 
and then left the room until the first game was concluded. This 
was done so the leader would simply appear as another subject who 
had no special information about the game or idea of the strategy 
the subject used in the first game. The contrived responses for 
the first game and the response sequence for the second game were 
maintained. 
The treatment condition for each subject was randomly assigned 
prior to the beginning of the experiment. 
Results 
The structure for this experiment was a 3 X 2 X 2 design. The 
factors consisted of type of leader, first game outcome, and sex. 
The unit of measure for data analysis was the total number of 
competitive choices made by each subject during the second game. 
All tests for significance were conducted at the p<.os level, and 
the F test confirmed the homogeneity of the group variances. max 
Table 1 is a summary of the analysis of variance. There were no 
significant interactions and only one main variable was significant, 
that of sex. In figure 2 are the mean number of competitive re-
sponses selected by each sex. 
Insert Figure 2 and Table 1 about here 
The analysis of variance for the attribution scale was performed 
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as a repeated measures design at the p<.05 level, and the F max 
test verified the homogeneity of the variances. The first 
question (D1) was descriptively reduced to an autocratic (+1) -
democratic (+7) scale. The cooperative - uncooperative choice of 
questions two and three were separately scaled from +7 to +1 re-
spectively (D2 and D4). The remaining three choices from each of 
questions two and three were reduced to a planned (+7) - unplanned 
(+1) scale (D3 and D5). And, the last question was converted to a 
rating of the leader as pleasant (+7) - unpleasant (+1). This 
analysis resulted in significance for three, two factor interactions. 
Table 2 is a summary of the analysis of the attribution scale ratings. 
The significant interactions of Leadership Style X Question Rating, 
Situational Outcome X Question Rating, and Sex X Question Rating re-
quired that the design be split to test for simple effects. These 
tests pointed to significant results which showed that a) the experi-
mental groups rated the leader a~ significantly more pleasant than 
did the control group, b) the win/lose effect of the first game was 
directly attributed to planned or unplanned strategy respectively, 
c) the women rated the leader as significantly more pleasant than 
did the men. Figures 3, 4, and 5 reflect the mean attribution 
ratings as a function of the questions. 
Insert Figures 3, 4, 5, and Table 2 about here 
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Since the first question of the attribution scale was de-
criptively reduced in the above analysis and because it contained 
the critical aspect of the democratic - autocratic dimension, a 
separate, post hoc analysis was performed on the four items in 
that question. This analysis of variance was conducted at the p<.05 
level and the F test verified the homogeneity of the variances. max 
This analysis (Table 3) resulted in two significant first-order 
interactions: Leadership Style X Situational Outcome and Leadership 
Style X Item Rating. A simple effects analysis pointed to the facts 
that: a) subjects who had an autocratic leader and lost the first 
game, rated the leader significantly lower, across all items, than 
did the other experimental or control group, b) the group with the 
autocratic leader rated the leader as less open minded than did 
the other two groups, and c) the autocratic leader group rated the 
leader as more demanding than did the other two groups. 
Insert Figures 6 and 7, and Table 3 about here 
Discussion 
The autocratic leadership style and the inability to achieve 
goals did not produce the significantly higher competition as 
predicted. Additionally, the analysis of the attribution scale did 
not produce a significantly different rating of the leader on the 
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autocratic-democratic dimension. This suggests that a) the leader 
did not establish his role well enough, b) that the situation was 
not long enough to develop the establishment of the role, c) the 
follower was intimidated by the leader and thus suppressed his 
competitive desires, or d) the experimental design simply did not 
work as projected. A strong trend on the attribution rating, to 
rate the autocratic and democratic leader as such, did exist. This 
trend was further supported by a significant difference in attrac-
tion towards the leader by those who interacted with him. The ex-
perimental groups rated him as significantly more pleasant than did 
the controls, and those who had a democratic leader showed a strong, 
though not significant, trend to rate him as more pleasant than did 
those who had the leader in the autocratic role. In addition, the 
post hoc analysis reflected a significantly lower rating of the auto-
cratic leader; he was described as being less open minded and more 
demanding, however, no significant difference was found on the auto-
cratic-democratic dimension. These trends would tend to support 
the first two explanations above. In such a short interaction, the 
leader may not have had the opportunity to establish a strong auto-
cratic role, especially if the subject blindly followed the leader's 
advice due to uncertainty, thereby never having to be directed or 
ordered by the leader to perform a specific action. Although 
Prisoner's Dilemma is an established form of obtaining competitive 
and cooperative behavior, this non-student subject pool may not have 
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been sufficiently familar with its procedure to view it as such and 
thus did not see the game as a route for competitive behavior against 
an autocratic leader. However, since it is a proven format, future 
research should provide for a longer interaction between leader and 
follower as they play through the matrices. This increased length 
may provide time for the role-relevant expectancies to be established. 
The situational outcome did not effect competition in a signi-
ficant manner. The attribution ratings did reflect significance on 
the aspect of strategy in the first game. Those who lost that game 
claimed they used poor or unplanned efforts whereas those who won 
said they utilized a planned method of play. Additionally, the 
post hoc analysis reflected a lower rating, across all four items 
of question one, of the autocratic leader by those subjects who lost 
the first game, however, this possible credit or blame was not strong 
enough to influence the second game outcome. It again appears that 
length of the interaction may have been a determining factor. With 
a longer leader-follower relationship, more intent may have been 
given to the leader which might have produced the hypothesized 
competition as a function of goal denial. Since equity and re-
ciprocations are functions of intention, it would appear that the 
subjects saw their outcome as strictly chance rather than the in-
ability of the leader. 
The obtained significance of the sex factor adds to the ever 
growing dimension of sex differences. Women were not as competitive 
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as the men. Additionally, the women rated the leader, irrespective 
of role, as significantly more pleasant than did the males. This 
reaction could be a function of the female being more accustomed to 
an autocratic male or boss, or due to the males' being affected, 
by several conflicting factors, when having to rate another male 
(the leader was always a male). This dimension should be more 
specific in future research to pinpoint why this factor was sign-
ificant. 
The outcome of this study would suggest that leadership style 
and situational outcome do not effect competition. However, the 
existence of certain significant factors and other strong trends 
points to the possible inconclusiveness of this data. A ten minute 
interaction was apparently insufficient to establish the leader's 
role and this factor alone may provide strong influences in future 
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Analysis of Variance: 
Question No. 1 Ratings 
Source df MS F 
Between 
Type Leader (A) 2 20.78 
Game Outcome (B) 1 .5.oo 
Sex (C) 1 8.80 1 .4.5 
AXB 2 23.28 3.84* 
AX C 2 2.46 0.41 
B X C 1 0.17 0.03 
AXBXC 2 18.22 3.01 
Errorb 108 6.06 
Within 
Question Rating (D) 3 7.41 
AXD 6 6 • .57 3.13* 
BX D 3 0.3.5 0.17 
C X D 3 1.00 0.48 
AXBXD 6 1.62 o. 77 
BX C X D 3 0.24 0.11 
AX C X D 6 0.10 0.33 
AXBXCXD 6 2.3.5 1 • 12 






Figure 1.. An example of the Prisoner's Dilemma, non-zero 
sum matrix used in this experiment. 
R = Reward points 
S = Sucker points 
T = Temptation points 
P = Punishment points 
S<.P<R<T 
2R~ S + T 
S + T = 0 
1 , 1 -2 , 2 
(R) , (R) (S) , (T) 
2 , -2 -1 , -1 




Figure 2. Mean number of competitive choices made by each 
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Figure 3. Mean rating for each question as a function of 
leadership style. n6 was significant (p<.OS). 
D1: Leader 
was autocratic (+1) - democratic (+7) 
D2: First game 
was uncooperative (+1) - cooperative (+7) 
n
3
: First game was unplanned (+1) - planned (+7) 
n4: Second game was uncooperati
ve (+1) - cooperative (+7) 
n5: Sec
ond game was unplanned (+1) - planned (+7) 
n6: Leader was unple
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Figure 4. Mean rating for each question as a function of 
winning or losing the first game. n
3 
was significant (p<.05). 
n
1
: Leader was autocratic (+1) - democratic (+7) 
n2: First game was uncooperative (+1)
 - cooperative (+7) 
n
3
: First game was unplanned (+1) - planned (+7) 
n4: Second game was un
cooperative (+1) - cooperative (+7) 
n
5
: Second game was unplanned (+1) - planned (+7) 
n6: Leader was unpleasant (+1
) - pleasant (+7) 
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Figure S. Mean rating for each question as a function of 
sex. n6 was significant (p<.oS). 
D1: Leader was auto
cratic (+1) - democratic (+7) 
D2: Firs
t game was uncooperative (+1) - cooperative (+7) 
n
3
: First game was unplanned (+1) - planned (+7) 
n4: Second game w
as uncooperative (+1) - cooperative (+7) 
n
5
: Second game was unplanned (+1) - planned (+7) 
n6: Leader was unpleasant (+1
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Figure 6. Mean overall rating by the first game losers 




















e=1 2 -:::-. 
0 
1 -





Figure 7. Mean rating for each portion of question one as a 
function of leadership style. n1 and n2 were significant (p<.05). 
D1: Restrictive 
(+1) - Open minded (+7) 
D2: Demanding (+1
) - Undemanding (+7) 
n
3
: Authoritarian (+1) - Democratic (+7) 
n4: Hindering (+1) - Helpful (+7) 
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The following consent statement was signed by each subject 
prior to the beginning of the experiment: 
My signature on this document testifies to the fact that I 
am participating in this experiment by choice. I understand that 
no information as to my participation or performance will be re-
leased, that no physical or psychological damage will result due 
to my participation, and that I may stop the experiment at any time 




The following statement was given to each subject at the 
conclusion of experiment: 
This experiment was designed to see how you would react toward 
the leader who was either democratic or autocratic when he assisted 
you in the first game. The first game was controlled so you either 
won or lost. We then allowed you to play a second game against the 
leader to see if you would be cooperative or competitive based on 
his leadership style and whether you won or lost the first game. 
Those of you who had no leader (an individual to work with) 
during the first game were the control group which is critical 
for the experimental comparison. 
Again, I would like to thank you for your participation and 
for the great assistance you have given me. 
VITA 
I was born in Jamaica, New York on 7 May 1948. Having moved 
south, at the age of three, to the little town of Summerville, just 
outside of Charleston, South Carolina, I claimed the south as my 
home. In 1970, I graduated with a B. A. in History from The Citadel; 
as a Distinguished Military Graduate, I was immediately commission-
ed as a Second Lieutenant in the Regular Army and entered on active 
duty. As a Field Artillery Captain, I have served at Ft. Sill, OK, 
Ft. Benning, GA, Ft. Bragg, NC, and in the Republic of Korea. My 
next assignment will be at Rutgers University as an assistant pro-
fessor of military science. My wife is the former Linda J. Elliott 
of Andrews, SC, and we have two daughters, Michele Anne and Lisa 
Marie. 
